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Article 6

Comment

New Trends in Informed Consent?
I. INTRODUCTION
Four recent cases have been hailed as opening a new door to recovery by plaintiffs in medical malpractice cases brought on a theory2
of informed consent. Canterbury v. Spence,' Wilkinson v. Vesey,
Cobbs v. Grant3 and Fogal v. Genesee Hospita 4 hold that the
plaintiff is not required to introduce expert testimony to establish
the nature and extent of the disclosure a physician must make to
the patient in order to obtain an informed consent. Prior to these
decisions courts had been almost unanimous in holding that a doctor
had a duty to disclose only those risks which a reasonable medical
practitioner of the same school of medicine would have disclosed to
the patient in order to obtain an informed consent. Prior to these
required expert medical testimony in order to establish the customary disclosure made by the members of the particular medical
community. These four cases are based on the premise that the
essence of informed consent is the patient's right to know and the
patient's right of self-determination. They establish a standard
of a reasonable patient in the plaintiff's position; what should have
been disclosed is ascertainable by a lay jury without resort to expert
testimony. It must be noted, however, that while negating the need
for expert testimony on the issue of the physician's duty of disclosure these cases continue to require it for other elements of the
plaintiff's case. Also, while perhaps easing the plaintiff's burden of
proof in regard to the elements of disclosure, these cases at the same
time increase the plaintiff's burden of proving proximate cause. 5
The question becomes not whether this particular plaintiff-patient
would have submitted to the treatment had a full disclosure been
made but instead would the reasonable patient in the plaintiff's position knowing the risks have consented to the treatment.
Thus the major impact of these four cases on the law of informed
consent is twofold: first, the necessity of expert testimony in estab1. 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972).

2. 110 R.I. 606, 295 A.2d 676 (1972).
3. 8 Cal. 3d 229, 502 P.2d 1, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505 (1972).

4. 41 App. Div. 2d 468, 344 N.Y.S.2d 552 (1973).
5. Wilkinson v. Vesey, 110 R.I. 606, 295 A.2d 676 (1972), is the only case

among the four referred to above which retains a subjective standard
as it relates to proximate cause.
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lishing the defendant-physician's duty of disclosure and second, the
standard to be applied in showing proximate cause. This Comment
will analyze these cases to determine the effect both on plaintiffs
and on the nature -ofinformed consent litigation.
DEVELOPMENT OF THE DOCTRINE OF
INFORMED CONSENT
The doctrine of informed consent is of fairly recent origin. The
early cases were grounded on a theory of battery involving instances of a physician performing an unauthorized operation. Four
main cases set the stage for the later malpractice litigation. Mohr
v. Williams6 is the landmark case treating failure to obtain informed
consent as a battery. In Mohr the physician obtained his patient's
consent to an operation on her right ear, then performed an operation on her left ear. The court, in discussing battery and the failure
to obtain adequate consent, stated:
[T]he evidence fairly shows that the operation complained of was
skillfully performed and of a generally beneficial nature.
Ii

[However] the act of defendant amounted at least to a technical

assault and battery. If the operation wa4 performed without plain-

tiffs consent, and the circumstances were not such as to justify its
it, it was wrongful; and if it was wrongful
performance without
7

it was unlawful.
In Pratt v. Davis8 the patient consented to an operation on her
womb. The operation went beyond her expectations and her ovaries
and uterus were entirely removed. The statement of the law in this
case paralleled that in Mohr; the court recognized the right of the
patient not to be touched without consent although there might be
exceptional circumstances in which consent would be impractical.
In the third case, Rolater v. Strain,9 a bone was removed from the
patient's foot, despite a promise from the surgeon to the contrary.
Even though there was no evidence that the bone served any function in the foot or that the physician had exercised less than ordinary skill, the plaintiff was permitted to recover. This case, however, differs from the first two to the extent that there was a specific prohibition of the act done. The fourth case in this group is
Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hospitals" where an operation
was performed on the patient while she was under anesthesia for
diagnosis. It was in this opinion that Judge Cardozo made his
famous statement:
6. 95 Minn. 261, 104 N.W. 12 (1905).
7. Id. at 267, 271, 104 N.W. at 14, 16.
8. 224 Ml.300, 79 N.E. 562 (1906).
9. 39 Okla. 572, 137 P. 96 (1913).

10. 211 N.Y. 125, 105 N.E. 92 (1914).
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Every human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to
determine what shall be done with his own body; and a surgeon
who performs an operation without his patient's consent commits
an assault, for which he is liable in damages ....

This is true,

except in cases of emergency where the patient is unconscious, and
where it is necessary to operate before consent can be obtained."1
Given the historic significance which Anglo-American society
places on the inviolability of the human body, it is easy to understand why assault and battery principles were assimilated into the
law of physician-patient relationships when no other adequate
theory of recovery then existed: the protected interest would be
jeopardized if the individual's absolute right to be free from unwanted procedures on his body were made to depend on the subjective intentions or motivations of the physician. 1 2 The failure
comprehensively to inform the patient of the risks and implications
of the surgery was treated as vitiating the consent and resulting in
liability for battery. Courts in a majority of jurisdictions used this
analysis for approximately the next fifty years. 18
The re-examination of battery as the appropriate theory for an
action under the doctrine of informed consent began in 1957 with
the decision in Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr. University Board of
Trustees.'4 This case involved paralysis following an aeortography
performed upon the plaintiff at Stanford University Hospital. The
court presented its view on the law of informed consent as follows:
A physician violates his duty to his patient and subjects himself
to liability if he withholds any facts which are necessary to form
the basis of an intelligent consent by the patient to the proposed
treatment. Likewise the physician may not minimize the known
dangers of a procedure or operation in order to induce his patient's
consent. At the same time, the physician must place the welfare
of his patient above all else and this very fact places him in a position in which he sometimes must choose between two alternative
courses of action. One is to explain to the patient every risk attendant upon any surgical procedure or operation, no matter how
remote; this may well result in alarming a patient who is already
unduly apprehensive and who may as a result refuse to undertake
surgery in which there is in fact minimal risk; it may also result
in actually increasing the risks by reason of the physiological re11. Id. at 129-30, 105 N.E. at 93.
12. 1 LouisEL. & W Ams, MEDIcAL MAPRAcTicE 223 (1973).
13. See, e.g., Moos v. United States, 225 F.2d 705 (8th Cir. 1955); Gist v.
French, 136 Cal. App. 2d 247, 288 P.2d 1003 (1955); Danielson v. Roche,
109 Cal. App. 2d 832, 241 P.2d 1028 (1952); Breedlove v. Aiken, 85 Ga.
App. 917, 70 S.E. 85 (1952); Bang v. Charles I. Miller Hosp., 251 Minn.
426, 88 N.W.2d 186 (1958); Hunt v. Bradshaw, 242 N.C. 517, 88 S.E.2d
762 (1955); Woodson v. Huey, 261 P.2d 199 (Okla. 1953); Hall v. De
Saussure, 41 Tenn. App. 572, 297 S.W.2d 81 (1956).
14. 154 Cal. App. 2d 560, 317 P.2d 170 (1957).
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suits of the apprehension itself. The other is to recognize that each
patient presents a separate problem, that the patient's mental and
emotional condition is important and in certain cases may be crucial, and that in discussing the element of risk a certain amount
of discretion must be employed consistent with the full disclosure
of facts necessary to an informed consent.15

A few months before the decision in Salgo, Professor Allan H.
McCoid published an article entitled A Reappraisal of Liability for

6
Unauthorized Medical Treatment.' The article contained a comprehensive survey of the relevant informed consent cases in the
United States and Canada and an evaluation of the treatment of the
issue by the courts. McCoid's premise was that the traditional
assault and battery theory when applied to cases of medical malpractice was awkward, if not erroneous, and that the assault and
battery theory should be limited to those cases in which the physician has intentionally deviated from normal practice in a manner
not intended to be beneficial to the plaintiff. The author's viewpoint was summarized as follows:

The author concludes that the trial and decision of these unauthorized operation cases would be greatly improved in terms of consistency of theory and appropriateness of liability if there were a single
basis for liability in all malpractice cases, other than the occasional
instance of an actual assault and battery in the sense of an intentional deviation from practice which does not tend to be beneficial
to the patient. The basis of liability should be deviation from the
standard of conduct of a reasonable and prudent doctor of the same
school of practice as the defendant under similar circumstances.
The author believes that under such a standard the patient will be
properly protected by the medical profession's own recognition of
its obligation to maintain its standards. One particular obligation
which the law may properly exact or impose, however, is the obligation of a doctor to make a reasonable disclosure to the patient
of the nature of his illness or infirmity, the nature of the treatment
proposed and the danger of using such treatment or alternative
treatment, and then permit the patient to decide whether to submit
to the treatment or not. To overcome any difficulties of proof, the
law may also properly create a presumption that where the patient
has not given express consent to the operation or treatment, there
has been a deviation from the standard of proper medical care,
which presumption will impose upon the doctor the onus of coming
forward with justification of his conduct by the use of qualified
medical evidence.17
This McCoid article coupled with the Salgo decision set the
stage for evolution in the informed consent doctrine. Beginning in
15. Id. at 578, 317 P.2d at 181.
16. McCoid, A Reappraisal of Liability for Unauthorized Medical Treatment, 41 MImx. L. REv. 381 (1957).
17. Id. at 434.,
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1960 with Natanson v. Kline,18 the courts began to realize that
informed consent involved a matter of professional conduct. Because in some cases disclosure might be undesirable or even dangerous, the decision in a particular case is a matter for professional
judgment in light of the applicable medical standards. After appropriating some of Professor McCoid's language 19 the court in
Natanson said:
In considering the obligation of a physician to disclose and explain
to the patient in language as simple as necessary the nature of the
ailment, the nature of the proposed treatment, the probability of
success or of alternatives, and perhaps the risks of unfortunate results and unforeseen conditions within the body, we do not think
the administration of such an obligation, by imposing liability for
malpractice if the treatment were administered without such explanation where explanation20could reasonably be made, presents any
insurmountable obstacles.
Shortly after the decision, defendant moved for a rehearing charging
that "the court has confused a malpractice suit, where negligence is
an essential element, with an assault and battery case, where negligence is not an essential element, thereby giving rise to a hybrid
action which is neither one of negligence nor one of assault and
battery, but may be a combination of the two.

'2 1

The opinion

denying the rehearing made it clear that the court intended to
decide a negligence case-not to impose liability in assault and
battery or to create a hybrid cause of action. Following the Natanson case and a Missouri case decided in a similar fashion, 22 the
trend in informed consent switched away from an assault and
battery theory toward a pure negligence theory. Under the prevailing view today the action, regardless of its form, is one for
negligence
in failing to conform to the proper standard for dis2
closure.

8

Thus the theory of informed consent decisions evolved from one
based on battery to the present negligence standard. Under battery
liability plaintiff needed only to prove that the consent was not in
fact "informed" for liability to ensue. The patient's "right to determine what shall be done with his own body" 24 required comprehension of the true nature of the procedure. When negligence emerged
18. 186 Kan. 393, 350 P.2d 1093, rehearing denied, 187 Kan. 186, 354 P.2d
670 (1960).
19. Compare 186 Kan. at 401-02, 350 P.2d at 1100 with McCoid, supra note
16, at 424.
20. 186 Kan. at 410, 350 P.2d at 1106-07.
21. 187 Kan. at 187, 354 P.2d at 671.
22. Mlitchell v. Robinson, 334 S.W.2d 11 (Mo. 1960).
23. W. PRossFR, HAnDBOOK OF THR LAw OF TORTS 165 (4th ed. 1971).
24. 211 N.Y. at 129, 105 N.E. at 93.
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as the preferred cause of action, however, the issue could no longer
be decided merely by asking if an effective consent had been obtained. Negligence implies both the existence of a duty and its
breach. This duty is usually defined as a standard of care. In
adopting the negligence theory, therefore, courts had to decide the
requisite standard of care to be applied in informed consent cases.
The Salgo court, laying the foundation for modern decisions, stated
that "[a] physician violates his duty to his patients and subjects
himself to liability if he withholds any facts which are necessary
to form an intelligent consent to the proposed treatment."25 The
court divided this duty into two alternative courses of action:
One is to explain to the patient every risk attendant upon any surgical procedure or operation, no matter how remote ....
The
other is to recognize that each patient presents a separate problem,
that the patient's mental and emotional condition is important and
in certain cases may be crucial, and that in discussing the element
of risk a certain amount of discretion must be employed consistent
with the full disclosure of facts necessary to an informed consent. 26
Salgo thus echoed the tone of Schloendorff and had as its primary
goal the vindication of the patient's right of self-determination. But
when this rationale was applied in the key case of Natanson v. Kline,
despite its ready adoption of a negligence analysis, the court had a
difficult time establishing the standard of care. The court finally'
resolved the issue by deciding that informed consent cases were like
any other malpractice actions. Hence the standard should be that
of what the reasonable medical practitioner would have done in the
same or similar circumstances: "The primary basis of liability in a
malpractice action is the deviation from the standard of conduct of
a reasonable and prudent medical doctor of the same school of

practice as the defendant under similar circumstances." 27 From

this crucial turning point until the appearance of Canterbury, Wilkinson, Cobbs and Fogalinformed consent doctrine waivered between
the two standards: (1) what the patient needed to know to maintain
his right of self-determination; and (2) what the medical profession
believed a patient needed to know to give a knowledgeable consent
to a proposed treatment or procedure. The medical standard of care
was readily and widely accepted by the courts; it is still the applica28

ble standard of care in the majority of American jurisdictions.
25.
26.
27.
28.

154 Cal. App. 2d at 578, 317 P.2d at 181.
Id.
186 Kan. at 411, 350 P.2d at 1107.
See George v. Travelers Ins. Co., 215 F. Supp. 340 (E.D. La. 1963);
Dietze v. King, 184 F. Supp. 944 (E.D. Va. 1960); Tatro v. Lueken, 212
Kan. 606, 512 P.2d 529 (1973); ZeBarth v. Swedish Hosp. Medical Center, 81 Wash. 2d 12, 499 P.2d 1 (1972); Stauffer v. Karabin, 492 P.2d
862 (Colo. App. 1971); Nishi v. Hartwell, 52 Hawaii 188, 473 P.2d 116
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The standard of care takes on added importance when viewed in
light of what a plaintiff must prove in order to show a breach.
When the standard is formulated as "what a reasonable medical
doctor would reveal to his patient in the same or similar circumstances," the majority of jurisdictions require the testimony of an
expert medical witness. The expert must establish medical custom
regarding disclosure in such cases for the plaintiff to establish a
29
prima facie case.

Thus with the evolution from a battery to a negligence theory
the doctrine of informed consent assimilated the form and the elements of traditional malpractice litigation.
II.

THE TRANSITIONAL CASES

The older approach was unquestioned in the majority of jurisdictions for approximately ten more years. In Berkey v. Anderson,0
however, the challenge to the traditional articulation began.
We cannot agree that the matter of informed consent must be
determined on the basis of medical testimony any more than that
expert testimony of the standard practice is determinative in any
other case involving a fiduciary relationship. We agree with appellant that a physician's duty to disclose is not governed by the standard practice of the physician's community, but is a duty imposed
by law which governs his conduct in the same manner as others
in a similar fiduciary relationship. To hold otherwise would permit
the medical profession to determine its own responsibilites to the
(1970); Green v. Hussey, 127 Il. App. 2d 174, 262 N.E.2d 156 (1970);
Negaard v. Estate of Feda, 152 Mont. 47, 446 P.2d 436 (1968); Kaplan
v. Haines, 96 N.J. Super. 242, 232 A.2d 840 (1967); Wilson v. Scott, 412
S.W.2d 299 (Tex. 1967); Ditlow v. Kaplan, 181 So. 2d 226 (Fla. App.
1966); Grosjean v. Spencer, 258 Iowa 839, 140 N.W.2d 139 (1966); Shetter v. Rochelle, 2 Ariz. App. 358, 409 P.2d 74 (1965); Aiken v. Clary,
396 S.W.2d 668 (Mo. 1965); Roberts v. Young, 369 Mich. 133, 119
N.W.2d 627 (1963); Haggerty v. McCarthy, 344 Mass. 136, 181 N.E.2d
562 (1962); Govin v. Hunter, 374 P.2d 421 (Wyo. 1962); DiFilippo v.
Preston, 53 Del. 539, 173 A.2d 333 (1961).
29. See Karp v. Cooley, 349 F. Supp. 827 (S.D .Tex. 1972); Collins v. Itoh,
160 Mont. 461, 503 P.2d 36 (1972); ZeBarth v. Swedish Hosp. Medical
Center, 81 Wash. 2d 12, 499 P.2d 1 (1972); Nishi v. Hartwell, 52 Hawaii
188, 473 P.2d 116 (1970); Kaplan v. Haines, 96 N.J. Super. 242, 232 A.2d
840 (1967); Wilson v. Scott, 412 S.W.2d 299 (Tex. 1967); Grosjean v.
Spencer, 258 Iowa 839, 140 N.W.2d 139 (1966); Ditlow v. Kaplan, 181
So. 2d 226 (Fla. App. 1965); Aiken v. Clary, 396 S.W.2d 668 (Mo.
1965); Roberts v. Young, 369 Mich. 133, 119 N.W.2d 627 (1963); Haggerty v. McCarthy, 344 Mass. 136, 181 N.E.2d 562 (1962); Govin v.
Hunter, 374 P.2d 421 (Wyo. 1962); DiFillippo v. Preston, 53 Del. 539,
173 A.2d 333 (1961); Natanson v. Kline, 186 Kan. 393, 350 P.2d 1093
(1960).
30. 1 Cal. App. 3d 790, 82 Cal. Rptr. 67 (1969).
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patients in a matter of considerable public interest. 3 '
Next a Washington court, citing Berkey, held in Hunter v.
Brown"2 that:
The physician-patient relationship is of a fiduciary character.
The inherent necessity for trust and confidence requires scrupulous
good faith on the part of the physician... His duty of disclosure
extends beyond the realm of risks. He must disclose to his patient
all material facts which reasonably should be known if his patient
is to make an informed and intelligent decision. The availability
of alternatives to surgery is an example of the kind of information
required.83

This opinion concluded that no expert testimony would be required
if the necessity of disclosure is so obvious that it can be recognized
by laymen.3 4 This approach leads to a jury determination in the
extreme case, but by no means goes so far as to abrogate the need
for expert medical determination as to what risks would be material
in all informed consent cases.
This same emphasis on materiality was present in the decision in
Getchell v. Mansfield.3
We hold therefore, that a plaintiff who alleges that a physician
failed to warn him of material risks inherent in his treatment, and
to advise him of feasible alternatives, need not produce expert medical testimony that it is the custom of physicians in the same or
similar localities to give such warnings in comparable cases. The
duty to warn and to advise of alternatives does not arise from and
is not limited by the custom of physicians in the locality. Rather
it exists as a matter of law if (1) the risk of injury inherent in
the treatment is material; (2) there are feasible alternative courses
available; and (3) the plaintiff can be advised of the risks and alternatives without detriment to his well being. If there is evidence
tending to prove all these elements, the plaintiff is entitled to have
his case submitted to the jury under proper instructions. In most
will be necessary to establish each of these
cases expert testimony
38
three elements.
31. Id. at 805, 82 Cal. Rptr. at 78. But this strong stance was retreated
from somewhat when in the next paragraph the court noted that even
if they had required expert testimony as to the standard in the medical
community such testimony was present in this case since a doctor who
subsequently treated the appellant had testified that it was standard
practice to inform a patient that a myelogram involved a spinal puncture when obtaining his consent to the procedure. So even while stating its view to the contrary, the court recognized that a medical community standard was still probably the governing rule of law in this
area in California.
32. 4 Wash. App. 899, 484 P.2d 1162 (1971).
33. Id. at 905-06, 484 P.2d at 1166. The court noted that the physician's
reasons for withholding facts were a matter of defense.
34. See notes 82, 83 and accompanying text infra.
35. 260 Ore. 174, 489 P.2d 953 (1971).
36. Id. at 182-83, 489 P.2d at 957.
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While the opinion rejects the medical standard of disclosure test for
breach, it allows expert medical testimony to determine the issue of
materiality instead of focusing on either this particular patient or
even an average patient. Thus although the case appears to abrogate a medical custom of disclosure, in reality it does not.
Finally, in Cooper v. Roberts3 7 the court articulated still another
standard.
A more equitable formulation would be: whether the physician
disclosed all those facts, risks and alternatives that a reasonable
man in the situation which the physician knew or should have
known to be the plaintiffs would deem significant in making a
decision to undergo the recommended treatment. This gives maximum effect to the patient's right to be the arbiter of the medical
treatment he will undergo without either requiring the physician
to be a mindreader into the patient's most subjective thoughts or
requiring that he disclose every risk lest he be liable for battery.
The physician is bound to disclose only those risks which a reasonable man would consider material to his decision whether or not
to undergo treatment.
There is no need to extend the requirement of expert testimony
into areas where no technical expertise is necessary. Determination of what a reasonable man would do or consider significant
within the context of a particular set of facts is standard fare for
jurors, for which they need no expert assistance.
After lengthy consideration of this issue, we find this determination to be the most equitable balance between the patient's right
to control what happens to his body, and the interest of fostering
the practice of responsive, progressive medicine.38

While this opinion most clearly sets forth the standard and rationale
which was expanded in Canterbury and succeeding cases, it was only
part of a general trend. The courts began to feel that the essence
of informed consent went beyond a doctor's failure to exhibit the
requisite professional care as viewed in relation to the performance

of his similarly situated colleagues. Instead the patient's need for
knowledge to maintain sovereignty over his own body became paramount.
A.

IV. THE FOUR BREAKTHROUGH CASES
Canterbury v. Spence39
Canterbury,the major case, established the reasoning and stand-

ards which were later adopted to a lesser or greater extent by the
other three cases considered below.
37. 220 Pa. Super. 260, 286 A.2d 647 (1971).
38. Id. at 267-69, 286 A.2d at 650-51.
39. 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
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In Canterbury,a 19 year old man, had been experiencing severe
pain between his shoulder blades. Before visiting a neurosurgeon,
he consulted two general practitioners who were unable to relieve
the pain. The doctor ordered x-rays which indicated no abnormality; a subsequent myelogram, 40 however, showed a "filling
defect" in the area of the fourth thoracic vertebra. Suspecting a
ruptured disc, the doctor recommended a laminectomy. 4 While
consulting with the doctor on the telephone, plaintiff-Canterbury's
mother asked if the operation was serious, the physician replied "not
anymore than any other operation." On the day of the operation,
Mrs. Canterbury signed a consent form. During the day following
the operation the plaintiff recovered normally, but on the next day
he fell from his hospital bed where he had been left unattended.
Several hours after this fall he began to experience total paralysis
from the waist down. Mrs. Canterbury signed another consent form
and defendant again operated. After the second operation plaintiff's
muscle control improved somewhat although at the time of trial he
remained partially paralyzed.
Plaintiff sought to recover medical expenses, pain and suffering
and loss of earnings on grounds that the physician had been negligent in performing the operation and that he had failed to inform
plaintiff beforehand of the risks involved in the surgery. At the
close of the plaintiff's case the trial judge granted the defendant's
motion for a directed verdict. The judge held that plaintiff failed
to prove negligence or proximate cause since he did not introduce
expert medical testimony on these issues. The United States Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia reversed.
The Canterbury court analyzed the existence and history of a
physician's duty to inform his patient about potential treatment,
delineating a standard which would define this duty:
The scope of the physician's communications to the patient, then,
must be measured by the patient's need, and that need is the information material to the decision. Thus the test for determining
whether a particularperil must be divulged is its materiality to
the patient's decision:
all risks potentially affecting the decision
42
must be unmasked.
A risk is material "'when a reasonable person, in what the physician
knows or should know to be the patient's position, would be likely
to attach significance to the risk or cluster of risks in deciding
40. A myelogram is a method of photographing the spinal cord.
41. A laminectomy is a surgical procedure for removing the posterior arch
of a vertebra.
42. 464 F.2d at 786-87 (emphasis added).
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whether or not to forego the proposed therapy.' "4 "[I] nherent and
potential hazards of the proposed treatment, the alternatives to that
treatment" 44 and the results which are likely if the patient foregoes treatment of his ailment or condition are all elements generally
requiring disclosure. The elements within each material category
defining the extent of the required revelation depend on the "incidence of the injury and the degree of harm threatened. '45 Thus a
statistically low risk may need to be communicated if the possible
harm is severe. The potential injury from treatment may outweigh
the possible benefits. Despite its finding of affirmative duties, the
court recognized that the physician is not obligated to discuss those
dangers which are inherent in any surgical procedure, those dangers
which the average person would normally be aware of anyway, or
those specific risks which his particular patient already has a special
knowledge of from past experience or learning. Neither is the
physician under a legal obligation to reveal collateral risks which
are not material to the patient's decision to accept or reject the
proffered treatment.
The court noted two exceptions to the general rule on the scope
and extent of the required disclosure. Both these exceptions have
been recognized in all informed consent cases from Salgo to the
present. The first exception occurs in emergency cases where the
patient is unconscious and therefore incapable of giving consent; at
the same time the harm from failure to treat the patient is greater
than any potential harm from the treatment itself. The court notes
that in such cases a relative's consent should be secured, if possible,
but that the gravity of the emergency may warrant treatment even
in the absence of consent. The second exception is the so-called
"therapeutic privilege" where "risk disclosure poses such a threat of
detriment to the patient as to become unfeasible or contraindicated
from a medical point of view." 46 This exception, however, is very
narrowly defined and must in fact be medically warranted. Further,
it is recommended that even here, the risks should be disclosed to a
close relative in order to protect more fully the -patient's interest.
Although these exceptions are a valid means of justifying the physician's failure to disclose material information in a given case, it
should be noted that they are elements of defense to be claimed and
47
proved by the doctor.
43. Id., at 787; quoting Waltz & Scheuneman, Informed Consent to Therapy, 64 Nw. U.L. Rzv. 628, 640 (1970).
44. Id. at 787, 788.
45. Id. at 788.
46. Id. at 789.
47. Id. at 791.
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Canterbury signals a departure from the traditional informed
consent formulation of the standard of care. Since the standard
of care is no longer a medical standard, expert testimony is not
needed to establish this element of the plaintiff's case. Canterbury,
however, does not completely abrogate the need for expert medical
testimony.
Experts are ordinarily indispensible to identify and elucidate for
the factfinder the risks of therapy and the consequences of leaving
existing maladies untreated. They are normally needed on issues
as to the cause of any injury or disability suffered by the patient
and, where privileges are asserted, as to the existence of any emergency claimed and the nature and seriousness of any impact upon
the patient from risk-disclosure.48
Thus, the traditional rules governing the need for expert testimony
remain untouched except where necessary to establish the required
standard of care. In that limited context "[e]xperts are unnecessary to a showing of the materiality of a risk to a patient's decision
on treatment, or to the
reasonably expectable effect of risk disclo49
sure on the decision."
Proximate cause is an essential element in any negligence action
but Canterbury's treatment differed from that found in traditional
malpractice cases. Under the Canterbury decision, the plaintiff
must first show that he was not informed of some risk inherent
in his treatment. He must further show that the unrevealed risk
did in fact injure him and that there existed a causal relationship
between the failure to inform and the solicitation of consent. If
the patient would have consented to the treatment knowing the
risk, then the physician's failure to disclose did not cause any injury.
In Canterbury,the court eschewed any use of subjective criteria
in determining proximate cause. Adopting an objective test instead, the court asked "what a prudent person in the patient's position would have decided if suitably informed of all perils bearing
significance." 50 Thus, if a reasonable patient in the plaintiff's position would have foregone the treatment knowing the risks involved,
causation is established. If, however, a reasonable patient would
have consented to treatment nonetheless, there is no causation. Although the plaintiff's testimony concerning his possible decision is
an element for the court to consider, it is not the governing element.
B. Wilkinson v. Vesey 51
Five months after the landmark decision in Canterbury, the
48. Id. at 791, 792.
49. Id. at 792.
50. Id. at 791.

51. 110 R.I. 606, 295 A.2d 676 (1972).
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Rhode Island Supreme Court adopted a similar approach in Wilkinson v. Vesey. The plaintiff, a 33 year old woman, had a routine
chest x-ray taken as part of a series of diagnostic procedures utilized
to locate the cause of radiating pains in her hands, arms and legs.
The x-ray showed a "shadow" and further tests resulted in a diagnosis of a probable "lymphoma of the mediastinum or possibly a
substernal thyroid. '52 The defendants recommended that she undergo a course of deep radiation therapy. Some three to four years
after undergoing the radiation treatments the plaintiff began to
notice a discoloration in her chest area and she sought medical care.
Subsequent treatment resulted in skin grafting, removal of seven
ribs, removal of the clavical and the sternum, and movement of
her heart which was then supported by muscle taken from her left
arm. There was evidence offered tending to show that these results
were traceable to the x-ray therapy. The trial court directed a verdict for the defendants and the plaintiff appealed. The supreme
court reversed on grounds that there was sufficient evidence to submit the case to a jury.
The court, in that portion of its opinion considering the informed
consent issue, noted that the majority rule applied a medical
standard requiring expert medical testimony. According to the
Wilkinson court, however, the correct test of adequate disclosure
is whether the physician told "all the known material risks peculiar
to the proposed procedure. ' 153 The court defined materiality as the
"significance a reasonable person, in what the physician knows or
should know is his patient's position, would attach to the disclosed
risk or risks in deciding whether to submit or not to submit to surgery or treatment." 54 In establishing the parameters of materiality,
the court cited the Canterbury formulation: a small chance of
death or serious injury might be material as well as a "potential
disability" which outweighs the potential benefits of the treatment
or the "detriment of the existing malady." 55 The opinion also noted
that there was no need to disclose risks which are already known
to the average patient or are within the special knowledge of the
particular patient. Nor need the physician tell "any and all of the
possible risks and dangers of a proposed procedure." 56 The Wilkinson court did not specifically define any exceptions to the duty to
disclose, such as the theraputic and emergency exceptions listed in
Canterbury.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56,

Id. at 611, 295 A.2d at 681.
Id. at 627, 295 A.2d at 689.
Id., citing Waltz & Scheuneman, supra note 43.
Id. at 628, 295 A.2d at 689.
Id. at 627, 295 A,2d at 689,
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By redefining the standard of care to conform to that in Canterbury, the court also abandoned the need for the plaintiff to produce
expert testimony on the matter.
The decision as to what is or is not material is a human judgment,

in our opinion, which does not necessarily require the assistance
of the medical profession. The patient's right to make up his mind
should not be delegated to a local medical group-many of whom
have no idea as to his informational needs...
The jury can decide if the doctor has disclosed enough information to enable the patient to make an intelligent choice without the
necessity of the plaintiff's expert. The plaintiff, of course, must
present evidence asj to the undisclosed facts and their materiality.
If the jury finds the undisclosed information immaterial, the doctor
has acted reasonably in withholding it. If it finds the nondisclosure is material, the doctor may have acted unreasonably and wl
be held
liable for his failure to obtain the patient's informed con7
sent.6
Wilkinson did not completely eliminate the use of a medical community standard. Discussing the fact that expert testimony is relevant in several areas the court provided that:
By our absolving the patient of the need to present medical testimony reflecting a community standard or disclosure, we do not
mean to prevent the physician from introducing evidence of such
a standard, if one exists, nor does it eliminate the need for a witness with the proper expertise whose testimony will establish the
known risks involved in the procedure in controversy. 5S

Thus, as in Canterbury, the court acknowledged the need for expert
testimony to establish known risks. Unlike Canterbury,however,
the Wilkinson court noted that a community standard is relevant
to the jury's consideration of the disclosure issue. The case appears
to shift this element of proof from the plaintiff to the defendant
rather than completely abrogating its applicability; if so, Wilkinson
is not so revolutionary a departure from standard practice as is

Canterbury.
The Wilkinson court apparently retained the subjective test for
proximate cause: given adequate disclosure, would this particular
plaintiff have submitted to the treatment.
In order to prevail in an action, where recovery is based upon the
doctrine of informed consent, the plaintiff must prove that if he
had been informed of the material risk, he would not have consented to the procedure. Shetter v. Rochelle, 2 Ariz. App. 358, 409
P.2d 74 (1965). It is obvious from the record that Winifred was prepared to offer evidence that she would have refused to undergo the
proposed therapy had she been properly informed. 59
57. Id. at 625, 626, 295 A.2d at 688.
58. Id. at 626, 295 A.2d at 688.

59, Id, at 628-29, 295 A.2d at 690,
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Taking the Wilkinson analysis of proximate cause in conjunction
with its resolution of the community standard issue, it is questionable whether the case is as modern as it is widely hailed to be.
Although Wilkinson adopts the materiality terminology, it merely
reshuffles the traditional elements of informed consent rather than
applying the analyses of Canterbury. The true test of its impact
will probably come only when it is seen how future decisions will
apply its principles.
C.

Cobbs v. Grant 0

Seven days after Wilkinson the Supreme Court of California decided Cobbs v. Grant. Mr. Cobbs had undergone surgery for a duodenal ulcer. Although apprised of the nature of the operation, he
was not informed of any risks inherent in the surgery. Several
days after the initial operation, additional emergency surgery was
required to repair a severed artery at the hilium of the spleen. The
spleen was removed at this time. Injuries to the spleen requiring
reoperation occur in approximately five per cent of operations of
the type initially performed on the plaintiff. About a month after
the spleen removal, doctors discovered a gastric ulcer requiring still
another operation four months later for the removal of about 50
per cent of the plaintiff's stomach. The development of a new ulcer
is also an inherent risk of surgery performed to relieve a duodenal
ulcer. After the third operation, the plaintiff again had to be hospitalized for internal bleeding caused by premature absorption of
a suture-this is also a risk inherent in surgery. In a suit against
the surgeon, the jury returned a verdict for $23,800. It was not,
however, possible to tell whether the award was for a negligent
diagnosis, or for negligently performing the surgery, or for the doctor's failure sufficiently to inform the patient of the risks involved.
The supreme court found insufficient evidence to support a verdict
on the theory of the surgeon's negligence in performing the operation; since it was not clear whether this negligence formed the basis
for the verdict, the supreme court reversed.
Discussing informed consent, the court noted that the majority
of "negligence" jurisdictions apply the medical community standard
of care. The Cobbs court, in rejecting this approach, relied heavily
upon the Canterburyopinion. In formulating the test to be applied
to the doctor, the opinion provided:
In sum, the patient's right of self-decision is the measure of the
physician's duty to reveal. That right can be effectively exercised
only if the patient possesses adequate information to enable an intelligent choice. The scope of the physician's communications to
60. 8 Cal. 3d 229, 502 P.2d 1, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505 (1972).
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the patient, then, must be measured by the patient's need, and that
need is whatever information is material to the decision. Thus the
test for determining whether a potential peril must be divulged is
its materiality to the patient's decision. . .. 1
Although not explicitly defining materiality, as was done in Canterbury and Wilkinson, the court did limit the concept creating a minimum standard of disclosure. Unless this legal minimum is met,
a patient's consent to surgery cannot be called "informed."
[W]hen there is a more complicated procedure, as the surgery
in the case before us, the jury should be instructed that when a
given procedure inherently involves a known risk of death or serious bodily harm, a medical doctor has a duty to disclose to his
patient the potential of death or serious harm, and to explain in
lay terms the complications that might possibly occur. Beyond the
foregoing minimal disclosure, a doctor must also reveal to his patient such additional information as a skilled practitioner of good
standing would provide under similar circumstances. 62
Beyond the minimum legal standard, the court will continue to recognize the expert standard established by the medical community
in which the defendant physician practices. Thus in all but the
clear cases (such as Cobbs where no risks were disclosed), the medical community standard again reigns supreme.
Cobbs recognized only one exception to the minimum standard
of disclosure.
A patient should be denied the opportunity to weigh the risks only
where it is evident he cannot evaluate the data, as for example,
where there is an emergency or the patient is a child or incompe61. Id. at 245, 502 P.2d at 11, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 515 (citation omitted).
62. Id. at 244-45, 502 P.2d at 10-11, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 514-15. The court
also noted:
The scope of disclosure required of physicians defies simple
definition. Some courts have spoken of "full disclosure" ...
and others refer to "full and complete" disclosure . . . but
facile expressions obscure common practicalities. Two qualifications to a requirement of "full disclosure" need little explication. First, the patient's interest in information does not
extend to a lengthy polysyllabic discourse on all possible complications. A mini-course in medical science is not required;
the patient is concerned with the risk of death or bodily harm,
and problems of recuperation. Second, there is no physician's
duty to discuss the relatively minor risks inherent in common
procedures, when it is common knowledge that such risks inherent in the procedure are of very low incidence. When
there is a common procedure a doctor must, of course, make
such inquiries as are required to determine if for the particular
patient the treatment under consideration is contraindicatedfor example to determine if the patient has had adverse reac-

tion to antibiotics; but no warning beyond such inquiries is

required as to the remote possibility of death or serious bodily
harm.
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tent.

For this reason the law provides that in an emergency

consent is implied ...

and if the patient is a minor or incompetent,

the authority to consent is transferred to the patient's legal guardian or closest available relative ....
In all cases other than the
foregoing, the decision whether or not to undertake treatment is
vested in the party most directly affected: the patient. 63
The court, however, also noted several defenses which would dilute
the duty of disclosure. The doctor has no duty to disclose the risks
when the patient asks not to be informed. 64 Neither is disclosure
required "if the procedure is simple and the danger remote and
commonly appreciated to be remote;" 65 or if it is "beyond that required within the medical community when a doctor can prove by
a preponderance of the evidence he relied upon facts which would
demonstrate to a reasonable man the disclosure would have so seriously upset the patient that the patient would not have been able
to dispassionately weigh the risks of refusing to undergo the recommended treatment."66 These exceptions merely restate the defenses
67
available under the traditional standard.
The court mentioned expert testimony only once:
A medical doctor, being the expert, appreciates the risks inherent in the procedure he is prescribing, the risks of a decision not
to undergo the treatment, and the probability of a successful outcome of the treatment. But once this information has been disclosed, that aspect of the doctor's expert function has been performed. The weighing of these risks against the individual subjective fears and hopes of the patient is not an expert skill. Such
evaluation and decision is a nonmedical judgment reserved to the
patient alone.6 8
This statement arguably relates to the relevance of expert testimony since it appears to differentiate areas where expert knowledge is needed from those in which lay knowledge is sufficient. Because this is as close as the opinion comes to segregating such functions it might be said that expert testimony is still required to prove
that (1) a given risk was inherent in the treatment; (2) the risks
involved in alternative methods of treatment or in a decision to
forego any treatment of the ailment; and (3) the likelihood of success. Once the expert has testified to the existence of the risks
63. Id. at 243, 244, 502 P.2d at 10, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 514.
64. Unlike the decision in Canterbury, the Cobbs court did not mention
the alternative disclosure to a relative.
65. Id. at 245, 502 P.2d at 12, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 516.
66. Id. at 246, 502 P.2d at 12, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 516.
67. Salgo was the first modern case to articulate what have since become
the standard defenses in informed consent cases. Decisions since then
have accepted the defenses established in Salgo and some have also
incorporated still others.
68. Id. at 243, 502 P.2d at 10, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 514.
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and the likelihood of success in a given case, the decision as to the
materiality of this information is deemed to be within the province
of lay knowledge. This standard is consistent with a holding that
a duty of minimal disclosure imposed by law does not require expert testimony for proof of breach. Since proof of a medical standard requires a medical expert, however, the court undercut its position by holding that there is still use for a medical community
standard in all cases not covered by the "minimal legal duty."
The Cobbs case, of course, provided that there must be a causal
connection between the defendant's failure to disclose and the patient's injury.
The patient-plaintiff may testify on this subject but the issue

extends beyond his credibility. Since at the time of trial the un-

communicated hazard has materialized, it would be surprising if
the patient-plaintiff did not claim that had he been informed of the
dangers he would have declined treatment. Subjectively he may
believe so, with the 20/20 vision of hindsight, but we doubt that
justice will be served by placing the physician in jeopardy of the
patient's bitterness and disillusionment. Thus an objective test is
preferable: i.e., what would a prudent person in the patient's position have decided if adequately informed of all significant perils
69

Thus, in addition to presumptively adopting the materiality test of
Canterbury, the Cobbs court also adopts its definition of proximate
cause.
Without its "minimal duty of disclosure" beyond which the medical community standard still applies, Cobbs would have more radically departed from traditional informed consent law and would
have more nearly parallelled the Canterbury decision. But by ininterjecting this traditional element, a question still remains:
whether the patient's informational needs should be the only consideration and if so, their relation to customary medical disclosure.
D. Fogal v. Genesee Hospital"0
The final case in this series is Fogal v. Genesee Hospital. Here
the plaintiff, Mrs. Fogal, was injured when application of a hypothermia blanket to lower her body temperature during surgery
caused necrosis of her feet, thighs and buttocks resulting in excision
of parts of her legs and buttocks and amputation of portions of
both feet. Suit was brought against the defendant doctors (in addition to suits against the hospital and the manufacturer and supplier
of the hypothermia equipment) on grounds of negligence and fail69. Id. at 245, 502 P.2d at 11-12, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 515 (citation omitted).
70. 41 App. Div. 2d 468, 344 N.Y.S.2d 552 (1973).
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ure to obtain an informed consent. The trial court dismissed the
cause of action for lack of informed consent; the case against the
doctors was submitted to the jury solely on the question of negligence. The jury decided against the hospital and the manufacturer;
it rendered a verdict of no cause of action against the surgeon, Dr.
Geary, and was unable to agree on a verdict in the case of the anesthesiologist, Dr. Templeton. On appeal the verdicts against the hospital, the manufacturer and its supplier were affirmed. A new trial
was ordered to determine the issue of the anesthesiologist's negligence, and on the issue of informed consent as it applied to both
doctors.
The court began its discussion by stating that the doctrine of
informed consent is not based on a theory of negligence but is in
fact a branch of assault and battery law because an uninformed
consent is tantamount to no consent. Despite this introduction, the
court went on to apply the standard elements of any negligence
action; viz., duty, standard of care, and proximate cause.
The court stated that there must be a "'reasonable disclosure
.of the known dangers ... incident to' the proposed treatment
(DeRosse v. Wein, supra)."' 71 It then defined a standard of care
72
for "reasonable disclosure" by adopting the Canterbury standard.
The definition of this duty to disclose and its scope have apparently never been explored by the courts of this state. As might
be expected, there are conflicting views on the subject in other jurisdictions .... Some jurisdictions have held that the duty to disclose and the required scope of the disclosure must be established
by expert medical testimony of the standards of the medical profession. In Canterbury,the court held that the duty and scope of disclosure arise apart from medical considerations and are not governed by the profession's standards of due care but by the general
standard of conduct reasonable under all the circumstances. This
general standard recognizes the patient's prerogative to decide on
the projected treatment whereas a medical standard is largely selfserving. We consider the Canterbury rule preferable and hold that
a doctor is obliged to divulge to his patient the risks which singly
or in combination, tested by general considerations of reasonable
disclosure under all the circumstances, will materially affect the
patient's decision whether to proceed with treatment. This is not
a retrospective determination. There should be no criticism of the
physician unless the fact-finder determines that the information
supplied was unreasonably inadequate .... 73
Thus Fogal, by implication, eliminated the requirement that the
plaintiff produce expert testimony to establish the standard of dis71. Id. at 473, 344 N.Y.S.2d at 559.
72. See text accompanying note 42 supra.
73. Id. (citation omitted).
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closure both by assimilating the Canterbury principles and by rejecting the medical community standard.
Fogal also directly adopts the objective approach to proximate
cause set out in Canterbury.
It is no answer that Mrs. Fogal did not state that she would
have refused the operation had she known of this particular hazard.
Whether she would have done so or not, her determination would
have been subjective and her statement would not have been conclusive evidence one way or the other. Whether the damage is
causally related to the failure to disclose must be determined objectively. The question is not, what would Mrs. Fogal have decided,
but what would a reasonably prudent person in lrs. Fogal's circumstances, having sufficient knowledge of the material risks incident to the procedure, have decided (Canterbury v. Spence, supra,
pp. 790-791). That the hypothermia was appropriate or necessary
to the surgery is beside the point. The patient may always choose
between two apparent dangers, one attendant upon the surgery, the
existing condition beother resulting from the continuation of an
cause of a decision not to undergo surgery. 74
From the limited discussion of the informed consent issue in the
Fogal opinion it appears that the court intended to adopt by reference the rationale of Canterbury without variation or extensive
alone, Fogal appears to
analysis of its own. Therefore, taken
75
have the same impact as Canterbury.
V.

THE EFFECT OF THE FOUR CASES

The four major cases signal a new era in informed consent litigation, doing for the modern approach what Salgo and Natanson
did for the transition from battery to negligence theory. Of course,
the full extent of their impact remains to be seen. The possibility
for wide variation in future developments can be seen within the
four cases themselves-only Fogal directly assimilates all the principles of Canterbury and applies them in the same manner as
Canterbury. Wilkinson and Cobbs present modifications of elements of proximate cause and standard of care respectively.
Canterbury presents the most thorough analysis of the doctrine of
informed consent and represents the most clearly defined departure
from the traditional law in this area; the remaining three cases appear to be adaptations of its basic approach.
A comparative analysis of the potential impact of these cases
is best undertaken by dividing the discussion according to the elements affected.
74. Id. at 474, 344 N.Y.S.2d at 560.
75. See note 50 and accompanying text supra.
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A.

Duty and Standard of Care
The major reforms have been in the applicable standard of care.
Changes instituted to implement the transition to this new standard
constitute the other areas of development. All four cases define
the physician's duty in terms of the patient's informational needsthe standard of care requires revelation of all information which
would be material to the patient's decision. Materiality, the key
to the approach, is the significance a reasonable person in what
the physician knew or should have known to be the patient's position would have attached to the risk or risks in question.7 6 By
taking this view, the courts can use a negligence approach to informed consent litigation while retaining the older concepts of the
"patient's right to know" and the "patient's right to decide what
will be done with his own body." After more than a decade of
litigation, the materiality standard puts informed consent doctrine
on the footing anticipated by the Salgo decision which first pointed
the direction from battery to negligence theory. Salgo said that
"[a] physician violates his duty to his patient and subjects himself
to liability if he withholds any facts which are necessary to form
the basis of an intelligent consent by the patient to the proposed
treatment." 71 This formulation approximates the materiality
standard since it is worded in terms of the patient's needs without
mention of a medical community standard.
Although the Canterbury court, along with Fogal, steadfastly
adheres to the materiality standard and completely rejects any use
of a medical community standard, the Wilkinson and Cobbs courts
diluted this stand. Wilkinson provided that the plaintiff need
prove only a breach of the materiality standard for his prima facie
case; if, however, a medical standard of disclosure does exist, it is
relevant evidence and may be introduced by the defendant. Cobbs
creates a minimal legal duty to disclose "a known risk of death
or serious bodily harm". Beyond the minimal disclosure, the duty
to inform includes any additional information a skilled physician
would reveal to his patient under similar circumstances. Cobbs and
Wilkinson are reminiscent of the McCoid article, which coupled with
Salgo, set the stage for the modern approach to informed consent.
McCoid indorsed a medical community standard which would align
76. This definition is adopted directly from Waltz & Scheuneman, Informed Consent to Therapy, 64 Nw. U.L. Rav. 628, 640 (1970):
A risk is thus material when a reasonable person, in what the
physician knows or should know to be the patient's position,
would be likely to attach significance to the risk or duster of

risks in deciding whether or not to undergo the proposed

therapy.
77. 154 Cal. App. 2d at 578, 317 P.2d at 181.
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informed consent with all other realms of malpractice law. But
beyond this, there was noted
[one] particular obligation which the law may properly exact or
impose ... [and that] is the obligation of a doctor to make a reasonable disclosure to the patient of the nature of his illness or infirmity, the nature of the treatment proposed and the danger of
using such treatment or alternative treatment, and then permit the
patient to decide whether to submit to the treatment or not. To
overcome any difficulties of proof, the law may also properly create
a presumption that where the patient has not given express consent
to the operation or treatment, there has been a deviation from the
standard of proper medical care, which presumption will impose
justification of
upon the doctor the onus of coming forward with 78
his conduct by the use of qualified medical evidence.

Thus McCoid implied that there may be imposed a minimal legal
duty to disclose certain information in addition to and independent
of the custom in the medical community. He also implied that in
some instances a presumption of failure to meet the required standard may be imposed to ease the plaintiff's burden of proof but that
this presumption might be overcome by the defendant-physician's
proof of compliance. Without directly advocating a primary medical community standard of care, Wilkinson and Cobbs reiterate certain elements of the McCoid approach by placing an evidentiary
value on a medical standard. Wilkinson and Cobbs may present
an option to those courts who are attracted to the Canterbury rationale but are unwilling to divorce the informed consent doctrine
entirely from other areas of malpractice law through total abrogation of the medical standard. This approach, it should be noted,
leaves unanswered the question of whether the individual's right
to determine what happens to his own body is vindicated by a combination of legal and medical duties.
Further, it should be recognized that even under the strictest
materiality standard certain exceptions are provided which free a
physician from his duty to disclose otherwise material information
to the patient. Most of these exceptions are recognized by the traditional informed consent law and are defined in terms of exceptions and/or defenses in those cases among the four considered here
which specifically recognize them. The one universally recognized
exception applies in the case of an emergency where the patient
is unconscious and delay in giving treatment would result in death
or serious harm to the patient (cited in Canterbury and Cobbs-).
Another widely recognized exception was first outlined in the Salgo
decision; this is the so-called therapeutic privilege. It recognizes the
fact that a patient's psychological well-being is important both to
78. 41 Mwn. L. REv., supra note 16, at 434.
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his physiological reaction to treatment and his eventual recovery.
Therefore if disclosure of the risks would so greatly upset the patient that it would affect the potential success of his treatment
or would render him incapable of making a rational decision to undertake the proposed therapy, the disclosure need not be made
(Canterbury). In addition, there is no need to discuss those risks
which are inherent in any medical/surgical procedure (Canterbury,
Cobbs), dangers which the average person would normally be
aware of (Canterbury,Wilkinson), and risks of which the particular
patient has special knowledge as a result of past experience or
learning (Canterbury,Wilkinson). Disclosure need not be made to
the patient if he is a child or is incompetent-although in this case
the consent of a close relative or the legal guardian is required
(Cobbs). Finally, the doctor is excused from his duty of disclosure
if the patient specifically asks not to be informed of the risks
(Cobbs).
Two other exceptions are arguably applicable under the newly
defined standard of care even though they are not mentioned in
any of the four cases. First, "[a] doctor does not have a duty to
disclose the risks of the improper performance of an appropriate
procedure;"7 9 second, the duty of disclosure "applies only to the
duty to warn of the hazards of a correct and proper procedure of
diagnosis or treatment, and has no relation to the failure to inform
of the hazards of an improper procedure."8 0 By applying these exceptions, the doctor's duty can be realistically mitigated where appropriate.
The trend of the 1960s toward aligning informed consent cases
with other malpractice actions through use of the medical community standard will reverse if the new materiality standard is widely
accepted. This is only appropriate since the informed consent question involves a patient's right of self-determination rather than his
right not to be negligently harmed once he submits to a given therapy. True self-determination can only be achieved where the duty
to disclose depends upon the patient's informational needs and not
upon the customary disclosure determined by the medical profession. This attitude has given rise to the standard of care established
in Canterbury, Wilkinson, Cobbs and Fogal; thus they signal a departure from the standard of care currently defined and applied
in the majority of jurisdictions.8 "
79. Mellet v. Pirkey, 171 Colo. 271, 466 P.2d 466 (1970).
80. Mull v. Emory Univ., Inc., 114 Ga. App. 63, 150 S.E.2d 276 (1966).
81. Wilkinson, unlike Fogal, Canterbury and Cobbs, merely switches the
burden of proof relating to the standard of care from the plaintiff to
the defendant. See note 57 and accompanying text supra.
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B. The Need for Expert Testimony
Under traditional informed consent law, expert medical testimony is required to establish that the defendant breached his duty
by failing to reveal a risk to his patient which the reasonable medical practitioner confronted with a similar situation would have revealed. However, by adopting a standard of care based not on a
medical standard but rather on a standard of what the patient
should know to make a meaningful decision, the need for expert
testimony is eliminated. Each of these four cases concludes (explicitly or implicitly) that a lay jury can decide as adequately as a
medical expert what information a patient needs to know. It would
be possible that a court might adopt a materiality, standard
while still delegating the determination of materiality to medical
experts, but this would conflict with the rationale behind the new
standard of care.
One element of confusion results from the statement in Wilkinson that if a medical community standard does in fact exist, evidence of such standard can be introduced by the defendant-physician. This statement opens the door for the defendant to produce expert testimony to establish a custom of risk disclosure. The
Wilkinson court never clarifies the relationship between the medical
custom of revelation and the question of what is material to the patient's decision. If a medical standard still controls, then Wilkinson
merely eases a plaintiff's burden of proof by shifting the responsibility for producing expert testimony to the defendant-in that
event, failure to disclose a material risk is relevant only to the establishment of the plaintiff's prima facie case. If a standard of
material information really controlled, then medical custom would
have no relevance at trial. Thus Wilkinson represents a precedent
whereby courts can apparently adopt the Canterbury reasoning
while mitigating its effect through use of expert testimony.
Cobbs represents still another compromise between the materiality and medical standards. Cobbs sets a minimum legal standard
which requires no medical expert testimony for its proof; beyond
this minimum, a medical community standard is still applicable and
apparently expert testimony will be required for a showing of its
breach. Cobbs represents another variation for courts to adopt a
patient-centered lay standard while recognizing the importance of
medical custom for informed consent. Cobbs does not merely
manipulate the use of expert testimony, but clearly divides the area
into two non-overlapping components.
Thus Canterbury represents the complete abrogation of the need
to produce expert testimony to establish a breach of its newly designated standard of care. Wilkinson and Cobbs present instances
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where expert testimony is merely shifted or given a new position
in the proof of a failure to obtain an informed consent.
An analysis of some traditional cases involving the need for expert testimony in specific situations helps measure the change represented by Cobbs, Fogal, Canterbury & Wilkinson. Some courts
have held that for informed consent, although the plaintiff must
normally produce expert testimony if the adequacy of the disclosure is at issue, no such testimony is required if the plaintiff's
claim is based on an allegation that no disclosure of any kind was
made. 2 Outside of the informed consent area, expert testimony
has been held unnecessary to a showing of negligence where the
patient can prove the physician left a sponge or other foreign object in his body after an operation."
No expert testimony is required because any layman can understand that standard medical
procedure does not include leaving foreign objects in a patient.
This particular rationale parallels that underlying the materiality
standard as adopted in these four cases. The materiality standard
presumes that a lay jury can decide what another layman (the
plaintiff-patient) would need to know in order to give an informed
consent. The similarity between these two areas of malpractice law
is particularly apparent in the Cobbs approach. Cobbs sets a
minimal legal standard of disclosure which may be determined
without expert testimony; beyond this the traditional community
standard is still applicable. In the foreign object cases, there is
also a minimal legal standard for the determination of negligence
which requires no expert testimony for its proof; but beyond this
clear-cut case one again enters the realm of traditional malpractice
law where the community standard of care applies. Viewed from
this perspective, the four cases-and Cobbs in particular-perhaps
represent less of a radical new approach to expert testimony than
an expansion of the area where lay knowledge is deemed adequate
for a determination of the applicable legal standard.
It should be pointed out, however, expert testimony has only
been abrogated for showing breach of the standard of care. Even
Canterbury specifically notes that expert testimony will still be required, in all but the clearest instances, to establish (1) risks inherent in a given procedure or treatment, (2) the consequences of leaving the ailment untreated, (3) alternative means of treatment and
their risks, and (4) the cause of the injury suffered by the plain82. Collins v. Meeker, 198 Kan. 390, 424 P.2d 488 (1967); Williams v.
Menehan, 191 Kan. 6, 379 P.2d 292 (1963); Natanson v. Kline, 187 Kan.

186, 354 P.2d 670 (1960). See also Woods v. Brunlop, 71 N.M. 221,
377 P.2d 520 (1962).
83. See cases collected at Annot., 81 A.L.R2d 597, 641 (1962); 141 A.L.R.
5, 25 (1942).
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tiff-patient. Finally, if the defendant-physician claims a privilege,
expert testimony is needed to show the existence of (1) an emergency which would eliminate the need for obtaining consent, and
(2) the impact upon the patient of risk disclosure where a full disclosure appears medically unwarranted.
C. Determination of Proximate Cause
All the major cases, with the exception of Wilinson,"4 use a
new formulation of proximate cause. Traditional informed consent
law required the plaintiff to testify that with knowledge of the
unrevealed risk, he would have refused to undergo treatment. It
was then the jury's function to pass upon the credibility of this testimony to make a finding of proximate causation. The modern approach questions the validity of this causation test; especially where
a risk has in fact materialized to the patient's detriment, he will
usually feel that with more disclosure he would never have undergone the therapy. Thus Canterbury,Cobbs and Fogal use an objective test: what would the reasonable patient in the plaintiff's position have decided had he been informed of all the significant risks.
In this manner the jury can weigh all the relevant elements; for example, while "[a] man with a back ache might not consent to a
procedure that has a 20% risk of paralysis . . .a man who is bedrid-

den because of back pain, probably would."8' 5
This formulation of proximate cause radically departs from the
current majority position, but it reflects the elements which the
jury probably considered anyway when evaluating the plaintiff's
credibility. This application of proximate cause does not totally
derive from the materiality standard; thus, courts wishing to retain
the medical community standard can still use the modern analysis
of proximate cause.8 6
84. Wilkinson utilizes the subjective standard of whether this particular
patient (the plaintiff) would have undergone the treatment in question had the unrevealed risk/risks been made know to him. Note
59 supra.
85. Alsobrook, Informed Consent: A Right to Know, INs. COUNsEL J. 580,
588 (1973).
86. This presents a possible variation for those courts not wishing to reshape completely the majority view of informed consent. This is apparently what was done in Funke v. Fieldman, 212 Kan. 524, 512 P.2d
539 (1973). The Funke opinion cited Tatro v. Lueken, 212 Kan. 606,
512 P.2d 529 (1973), a case decided the same day which strongly reasserted the standard of disclosure to be that disclosure which a reasonable medical practitioner would make in similar circumstances, and at
the same time adopted the Canterburyanalysis of proximate cause as
being preferable and forthwith the controlling law on that element of
informed consent in Kansas.
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VI.

CONCLUSION

Canterbury, and Fogal, which appears to adopt the Canterbury
approach by reference, clearly represent a reformation of traditional informed consent law. The impact of these cases in other
jurisdictions remains to be seen. There is a good possibility that
future decisions, while formally adopting the reasoning behind Canterbury, will retreat somewhat in its application as did the courts
in Wilkinson and Cobbs. This is a likely compromise since courts
in current majority jurisdictions may be unwilling totally to divorce
themselves from the familiar medical community standard as it applies to informed consent in one giant reversal of existing law. The
courts in Canterbury and Fogal were less constrained in adopting
a new approach, because as they noted in their opinions, there was
no precedent in this area of the law in their jurisdictions. Thus
the Wilkinson or Cobbs hybrid, or some other variation on the Canterbury theme, could provide a basis for a gradual reversal of current views.
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